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HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS: THE LAW IN FLUX
AND CONFLICT
Kenneth Lassont
This Article examines the recent surge in litigation arising
from homosexuals' assertions of Constitutional rights. The
author concludes that the recent cases reflect substantial
judicial confusion, and suggests that both Constitutional
principles and libertarian philosophy generally require
resolution of the conflicts in favor of equality without regard
for sexual preference.
Although in most states and many countries homosexual
activity remains condemned as a crime,' there is a growing public
and political disposition to regard the condition as something that
should be treated - or tolerated. 2 Many go even further, asserting
t A.B., M.A., The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., University of Maryland School
of Law; Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Member of
the Maryland Bar. The writer wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of
Daniel R. Anderson and Charles P. Bauer, both now graduates of the School of
Law and former members of the University of Baltimore Law Review.
1. See ALA. CODE § 13-1-110 (1978); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 to -1412
(1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1972); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §510.100
(1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89 to 89.1 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (Supp. 1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 272, §§ 34, 35
(West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-505 (1977);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §886 (West 1958); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11- 10-1 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-403 (Supp.
1979); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp. 1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West Supp.
1979).
Maryland is one of 29 states that imposes criminal penalties for private
homosexual conduct between consenting adults. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 553-554 (Supp. 1979). See generally Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the
Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult
Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REV. 91 (1970). In 1976, the
Maryland legislature rejected the State Commission on Criminal Law's
recommendation that private sodomy be deleted from the Crimes and Punish-
ments article of the Maryland Annotated Code.
2. See, e.g., Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Recommendation and
Report to the House of Delegates, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (1974); REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, Report No. 247
(1957); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). All of
the preceeding authorities have recommended the abolition of criminal penalties
for consenting homosexual acts. See generally E. BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY:
DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? (1971); T. LA HAYE, THE UNHAPPY GAYS (1978); and A.
BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY (1977).
State and federal courts, however, routinely inflict criminal punishments on
consenting homosexual adults. See notes 167-74 and accompanying text infra.
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that one's sexual preference must be fully respected and that,
provided there is no imposition of one's proclivity upon others, it
should neither be a bar to employment nor impinge free speech or
association. 3 Is this view the enlightened opinion of legal scholars
and social scientists, or a less deliberate and more biased predilec-
tion of "libertarians" and homosexuals themselves?
There are several thousand reported cases in which homosexual-
ity has been an issue, 4 and many of the decisions regarding
constitutional rights are conflicting. Judicial opinions in the area
may be roughly divided into those which look upon homosexuals as
either sick or immoral, 5 and those which view them merely as an
unpopular group entitled to the same civil liberties as anyone else.6
In the meantime, a legislative trend toward removing the criminal
sanctions, at least as they pertain to consensual sodomy, appears to
be taking shape.
7
3. In California, the so-called gay rights movement has gone a step beyond, by
asserting the right to proselytize. The City of San Francisco actively recruits
homosexual police officers. See San Francisco Recruiters Open Gates to Gay
Lawmen, Balt. Sun, May 8, 1979, at B1, col. 5.
4. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979). See generally
Knutson, The Civil Liberties of Gay Persons, 2 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 337 (1977).
Professor Knutson is principal investigator on a project to gather data pertinent
to sodomy and homosexual cases, sponsored by the Center for Homosexual
Education, Evaluation, and Research, San Francisco State University.
Although Maryland has not been, by any stretch of the imagination, a front-
runner in pursuing homosexual rights, a significant number of cases involving
sodomy recently have been before the Maryland courts. See State v. Grady, 276
Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975);
Phipps v. State, 39 Md. App. 206, 385 A.2d 90 (1978); Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App.
331, 367 A.2d 90 (1976); Edmonds v. State, 18 Md. App. 55, 305 A.2d 205 (1973).
5. See generally Knutson, The Civil Liberties of Gay Persons, 2 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
337, 339-40 (1977).
6. Id. See also Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974); note 145 and accompanying text infra.
7. The following 22 jurisdictions had, as of July of 1979, removed criminal
sanctions imposed upon private homosexual acts between consenting adults:
Alaska; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana;
Iowa; Maine; Nebraska; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North
Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; South Dakota; Vermont; Washington; West Virginia;
Wyoming. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 950-51 (1979).
In Maryland, a local ordinance has been passed by Howard County which
prohibits discrimination based upon "sexual orientation or personal appear-
ance." HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 12.200 (1978). Sexual orientation has been
defined in the Code as "the status of an individual as to homosexuality,
heterosexuality or bisexuality by preference or practice." Id. at § 12.201(x).
Legislators fear voter backlash should they support repeal of sodomy laws.
The Community Relations Commission of Baltimore, for example, has drafted an
ordinance prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals, but has voiced
pessimism over its chances for passage in an election year. UNPUBLISHED
MINUTES OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMISSION, June 20, 1979. Note, however,
that Maine repealed its sodomy law precisely because it was unenforceable.
Potter, Sexual Offenses, 28 ME. L. REV. 65 (1976). Many western nations also
permit homosexual acts without penalty. See Richards, Unnatural Acts and the
[Vol. 9
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the constitutional
foundations and confused status of homosexual rights, and to




Once rarely addressed except by psychiatrists and academics, 9
the issue of homosexual rights today is commonly found in local
elections, parent-teacher association meetings, corporate board
deliberations, daily news reportage, and a variety of other milieus. 10
Unfortunately, though, relaxation of the taboo has not always
served to clarify the pertinent moral and legal questions. The
stereotype of the homosexual is still a confused hodgepodge, often
yielding the image of an effeminate character with a sibilant
vocabulary. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines homosexu-
ality simply as the sexual desire for members of one's own sex. But
homosexuals are not necessarily pederasts (older men interested in
young boys) nor transexuals (persons who exhibit gender confusion
and appear to be uncomfortable with their respective sex roles), nor
transvestites (people who are primarily heterosexual but derive
pleasure from dressing as members of the opposite sex)."1 And
debate still rages whether homosexuality is a disease.
12
The law regarding homosexuality is but slightly more clear than
the moralistic questions. In most jurisdictions one has the right to be
a homosexual, but no right to participate in homosexual activity.
Under the Constitution a person cannot be punished for physical
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281,
1336 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Richards]; W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 293, 305-07 (1973).
8. For an exhaustive discussion of homosexual issues, see Rivera, Our Straight-
Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
9. See generally J. LAURITSENT AND D. THORSTAD, THE EARLY HOMOSEXUAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1864-1935) (1974). See also JEREMY BENTHAM'S ESSAY
ADVOCATING DECRIMINALIZATION OF SODOMY (1785) (referred to at 3 J. HOMO-
SEXUALITY 309 (1978)).
10. See, e.g., More Cities Face Battles Over Homosexual Rights, N.Y. Times, May 28,
1978, at 36, col. 3.
11. See generally A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MALE 610-66 (1948). See also W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMO-
SEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979).
12. The American Psychiatric Association no longer classifies homosexuality as a
mental disease. See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4. Compare T. LA HAYF,
THE UNHAPPY GAYS (1978), with 1). LOOVIS, STRAIGHT ANSWERS ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY FOR STRAIGHT READERS (1977). See also A. Bieber, HOMO-
SEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALS (1962); and note
17 infra.
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traits over which he13 lacks control (e.g., alcoholism), but neither will
the same individual be permitted to justify his participation in acts
which historically have been considered "unnatural."'14 Moreover,
homosexuality has been used legally as a basis for discrimination in
employment.
1 5
The earliest association of homosexuality with the term
"unnatural" can be found in Plato's Laws.1 6 Although Plato himself
was thought to be a homosexual,17 he firmly maintained that sexual
relations between men are unnatural in that they undermine the
development of desired masculine traits, such as courage and self-
control.18 (Implicit in this notion is the idea that homosexuality
degrades men to the status of women, which most other Greek
philosophers also found shameful.) Plato's belief was reflected in
early Judaeo-Christian thought that male sexuality has as its only
purpose procreation within marriage.1 9
The concept that homosexuality results in a diminution of men to
the status of women can be traced to the Book of Leviticus, in which
it is written: ."If a man also lie with mankind as he lieth with a
woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall
surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them." 20 Such
religious condemnation of homosexuality became the rationale for
the none-too-subtle bias of a number of legal scholars among whom
was Blackstone, who obliquely defined the homosexual act (presum-
ably sodomy) as "an infamous crime against nature, committed with
either man or beast ... the very mention of which is a disgrace to
13. The writer, having purposefully chosen to use the traditional impersonal
masculine pronoun, notes that in most jurisdictions female homosexuality -
lesbianism - is legal. But see United States v. Cozart, 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1974)
(sodomy also includes cunnilingus).
14. See generally Richards, note 7 supra.
15. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d
464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974). See also notes 131-52 and accompanying text infra.
16. PLATO, LAWS, Book VIII 835(d)-42(a).
17. In a letter to an American mother, Freud wrote:
Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be
ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness;
we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function produced by a
certain arrest of sexual development. Many highly respected individuals
of ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several of the
greatest men among them (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo de Vinci, etc.)
It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime, and cruelty
too.
LETTERS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1873-1939, 419-20 (E. Freud 1961).
18. PLATO, LAws, Book VIII 835(d)-42(a).
19. Id. See also Richards, note 7 supra, at 1293-94.
20. Leviticus 20:13. See also Genesis 19 (recounting the fall of Sodom and
Gomorrah); Richards, note 7 supra, at 1294-95; Goodich, Sodomy in Ecclesiasti-
cal Law and Theory, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 427 (1976).
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human nature. '2 1 Blackstone concluded that the proper punishment
for the crime was death, preferably by burning.
22
The crime of homosexuality was originally within the sole
province of the ecclesiastical courts; the first English statute was
enacted in 1533.23 In this country most states passed laws against
sodomy at an early date, and the majority have them to this day.
24
Although Blackstone's characterization of sodomy remains in use in
several American jurisdictions, 25 constitutional objections to the
vagueness of the term "unnatural" as used in criminal statutes have
led to greater specificity in criminal codes. The laws of Virginia, for
example, contain the following language:
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the
anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such
carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a class six
felony.
If any person shall by force carnally know any male or
female person by the anus or by or with the mouth he or she
shall be guilty of a class three felony.
26
It was this statute that formed the basis of the landmark case of Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
27
The plaintiffs in Doe sought a declaratory judgment that the
Virginia law was unconstitutional insofar as it affected private
homosexual activities between consenting adults. Among other
arguments, they claimed the statute violated their constitutional
right to privacy. 28 The United States District Court for the Eastern
21. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215, (emphasis in original). See generally
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216.
Blackstone traces the historical origin of such punishment to biblical times,
observing that the "voice of nature and of reason and the express law of God
determined [sodomy] to be capital. Of which we have a signal instance long
before the Jewish dispensation by the destruction of two cities by fire from
heaven; so that this is a universal, and not merely a provincial, precept." Id.
(footnote omitted).
23. 25 Hen. 8, c.6 (repealed by 9 Geo. 4, c.31 [1828]). See also W. BARNETT, SEXUAL
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1973).
24. See note 1 supra; Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 553 n.1, 570 n.93 (1976).
25. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 272, § 34 (West 1970). See also R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 389-92 (2d ed. 1969).
26. VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp. 1979). Maryland's statute is worded similarly.
27. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Cf. Mississippi
Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1976) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
28. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1974). See
generally Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:




District of Virginia, however, declared that the so-called right to
privacy extended only to married couples and not to homosexual
relationships, and that the "promotion of morality and decency" was
a sufficient basis for the prohibition of private sodomy.29 The case
was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court of the United
States .3
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GRISWOLD THROUGH
ROE TO DOE AND BEYOND
The concept of a guaranteed right to privacy was first seriously
contemplated in an 1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis. 31 It was recognized as early as 1902 in the
context of civil torts, and has been frequently invoked since, both
statutorily and through case law.3 2 The theory of a constitutional
right to privacy, however, is of far more recent vintage. Prior to 1965,
privacy had never been regarded as an independent constitutional
right - perhaps simply because the word "privacy" appears
nowhere in the Constitution.3 3 But the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut34 invalidated a statute forbidding the use of contracep-
tives as it applied to a married couple, on the grounds that it violated
a constitutional right to privacy implicit in the marital relationship.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that an independ-
ent right t/) privacy could be inferred from a number of constitu-
tional provisions:
29. Id. at 1202.
30. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would have noted
probable jurisdiction and brought the case on for hearing). Apparently Justice
Marshall would have extended Roe in order to reverse the district court. See B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 425 (1979).
The Doe case was heard in the district court before a three-judge court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), and was before the Supreme Court by right of
direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
With respect to the effect of a memorandum affirmance on appeal, see note
56 and accompanying text infra.
31. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
32. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Corp., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902);
N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 132, § 1-2 (1903).
33. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("private property"). Marital privacy, as a fundamen-
tal right, was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the
dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961). Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe only recognized marital sexual
intimacies as worthy of a right to privacy. He specifically excluded all
extramarital sexual conduct, including homosexuality. Id. at 553. Sexual privacy
was mentioned as early as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), an equal
protection case, but one emphasizing marriage and procreation as "basic civil
rights" and requiring "strict scrutiny." For a discussion of the strict scrutiny
standard of review see notes 67-95 and accompanying text infra.
:34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house"
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms "the right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender
to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
35
Justice Goldberg, concurring and joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan, believed the right to privacy was included in
the "liberty" interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, using
the ninth amendment as evidence that such liberty was not
restricted to specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.36 Justice
Harlan, also concurring, declared the right to privacy to be part of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. ' 37 Harlan's view later received majority
approval in Roe v. Wade,38 where the Court stated:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.
39
The constitutional right of privacy was extended to include
circumstances outside marriage. In Stanley v. Georgia,40 the Court
held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the private possession
of obscene materials. "[A]lso fundamental," said the Court, "is the
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy."" Three years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,42 the
35. Id. at 484.
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
37. Id. at 500. Due process was likewise the basis for Justices Goldberg, Warren,
Brennan, and White. Justice Douglas also mentions the due process clause of the
14th Amendment, but it is not clear whether he is referring to incorporation or to
an independent source of rights.
38. 410 U.S. 113 (197:3).
39. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
40. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
41. Id. at 564.
42. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1979]
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Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute which forbade
the distribution of contraceptives to single individuals, on the
grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 43 The Eisenstadt majority held that Griswold's doctrine
of marital privacy was actually an individual right - that indeed if
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual
(married or single) to be free from unwarranted governmental
meddling into matters so personal as the decision whether to bear a
child.
44
A number of lower courts have suggested that the right of
privacy, as enunciated in Griswold and extended and modified in
Eisenstadt and Roe, could be applied to protect private adult
consensual homosexual acts from criminal prosecution. 45 The
Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Doe decision, however,
appears to support a contrary conclusion.
When the lower federal court in Doe upheld the Virginia statute,
it narrowly construed Griswold as limiting the right of privacy to the
marital relationship. "Homosexual intimacy" was not protected
because it "is obviously no portion of marriage, home, or family
life."46 The Virginia district court cited both Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion in Griswold47 and Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman48 for the proposition that homosexual
activity is still "denunciable by the State.' 49 Additionally, valid
concerns of "morality and decency"50 were found to be served by the
statute in question, because these interests formed a "rational basis
of state interest demonstrably legitimate and mirrored in the cited
decisional law of the Supreme Court."51
43. 405 U.S. at 446-55. The Court never addressed the statute's validity under the
strict scrutiny test because 'the law failed to satisfy the more lenient equal
protection standard. Id. at 447 n.7. Some commentators believe this case
extended the right of privacy to homosexuals. See, e.g., Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636,
639-40 (1974).
44. Id. at 453. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Court
invalidated zoning ordinance that deprived grandmother from living in same
residence with grandsons). Prior to Griswold, it was assumed that sodomy laws
applied as well to husband and wife. See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1973). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 491
F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); State v. Callaway, 25
Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v.
Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). The latest case to bring consensual
homosexual activity under the protection of the right to privacy - both
subsequent and contrary to Doe - is New York v. Onofre, 48 U.S.L.W. 2520 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980).
46. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975).
47. Id. at 1201 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965)).
48. Id. at 1201-02 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961)).
49. Id. at 1201.
50. Id. at 1202. See note 187 and accompanying text infra.
51. Id. at 1203.
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Only the dissenting opinion of Justice Merhige sought to bring
homosexuality under the umbrella of the right to privacy. Applying
both Eisenstadt and Roe, he would have ruled that
the right to privacy in sexual relationships is not limited to
the marital relationship .... [I]ntimate personal decisions
or private matters of substantial importance to the well-
being of the individuals involved are protected by the Due
Process Clause. The right to select consenting adult sexual
partners must be considered within this category. The
exercise of that right, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
should not be proscribed by state regulation absent compel-
ling justification.
52
Had the Supreme Court chosen to hear argument in Doe, it
would undoubtedly have been provided the cogent suggestion that
the constitutional right of privacy enunciated in Stanley, Eisenstadt,
and Roe must logically apply to homosexual activity within the
home. The Court in Stanley appeared to go a good deal further than
merely prohibiting the government's regulation of privately-held
pornography:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.
5 3
In this context are not body and mind synonymous? It is significant
that the Court took pains to quote from Olmstead v. United States
54
in suggesting the constitutional derivation of the right of privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the most
valued by civilized man.5
5
52. Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
53. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
54. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
55. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) (emphasis added). See generally Wilkinson & White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
19791
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It should be noted that the precedential value of the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Doe is not altogether certain. It is
well established that a summary affirmance does not necessarily
represent adoption of the opinion below, and may only be the most
effective way for the Court to avoid a decision in order to gain time
for a more thorough consideration of the issue in question.5 6 Yet the
Fourth Circuit has already held that the Supreme Court's decision in
Griswold "necessarily confined the constitutionally protected right
of privacy to heterosexual conduct, probably even that only within
the marital relationship. '5 7 One probable result of Doe, at least, is to
validate the various anti-sodomy statutes in effect today.
58
For this reason, and because the Court's summary affirmance
appeared to reverse the trend toward expansion of the individual's
right to privacy and protection from unwarranted government
regulation, Doe has been greeted with a broadside of criticism by
civil libertarians and legal scholars.59 Perhaps the most penetrating
condemnation of Doe, and the most thorough analysis of and
argument for the homosexual's right to privacy, is Professor
Richards' learned article. 60 He quotes at length from Judge
Merhige's dissenting opinion, 61 and concludes that:
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance ... reflects
popular imagination, abruptly truncating the reach of
constitutional values in the name of "unnatural acts," which
are excluded from the constitutional scrutiny otherwise
required. In Doe, the Court failed to develop constitutional
values in a reasonable way. Instead of showing how
constitutional values, popularly accepted in the area of
contraception, equally apply to unjustly hated minorities,
the Court acquiesced in unexamined popular bromides and
shabby arguments unworthy of our constitutional tradi-
tion.62
56. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See also Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 553, 554-55 n.12 (1977). But see Note. Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice:
A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 713 (1956).
57. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). See also
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 989 (1971). Dicta in a number of cases, however, have
interpreted the Court's holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), as
extending the right of sexual privacy to all persons. See note 45 and
accompanying text supra.
58. See L.A. Times, March 30, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
59. E.g., Note, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Setback for Right to Privacy, 65
Ky. L.J. 748 (1977). See In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1977) (court
specifically rejected Doe); N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1976 at 37, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1976, at 17, cols. 1 & 2; Knutson, The Civil Liberties of Gay Persons, 2 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 337 (1977).
60. Richards, supra note 7.
61. Id. at 1321.
62. Id. at 1346.
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But in pouring forth an impressive torrent of empirical and
philosophical proofs that homosexuality is natural and harmless, it
appears that the professor may be protesting too much. His soundest
argument is often obscured. The fact remains that the practice of
homosexuality has offended the moral sensibilities of the greater
part of society throughout history, and that fact cannot easily be
dismissed with the theory that the immorality of homosexuality is
but "mere social convention." 63 (To posit further that "love is a civil
liberty"6 4 is to flirt with the dubious notion of law as poetry.)
The strongest argument should be, simply, that there is no legal
or moral justification for discriminating against any group, no
matter how unpopular, when that group does not seek to impose its
views upon others and when a deleterious effect on the broader
society cannot be demonstrated.65 The more difficult question is how
to determine when a personality trait becomes an imposition, or
when an unpopular private activity adversely effects the public
welfare. The right to privacy, after all, is a double-edged sword.6 6
III. EQUAL PROTECTION: EISENSTADT,
FRONTIERO, AND DOE
The Doe case serves likewise to articulate another facet of
homosexual-rights litigation: homosexuals are not viewed as a
"suspect class," against whom any discrimination must be subjected
to the "strict scrutiny" test, but instead are treated as a group to
which the less severe "rational basis" standard is applied.
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deny
any person the equal protection of the law.67 In its protection of
individual rights, this clause has been interpreted to preclude "the
enforcement of exclusionary classifications based upon deeply felt
beliefs which are not grounded on objective, rational distinctions." s
In many situations the government need only establish some
rational basis for its discriminatory behavior in order to justify
regulatory prohibitions. 69 But where a discriminatory law touches
upon a "fundamental interest,"70 or creates a "suspect classifica-
63. Id. at 1338.
64. Id. at 1347.
65. See New York v. Onofre, 48 U.S.L.W. 2520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), and notes
177-197 and accompanying text infra.
66. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (local ordinance forbidding door-
to-door solicitation held not to violate 1st or 14th amendments); cf. Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (local ordinance forbidding any person to
distribute handbills door-to-door held invalid as a denial of freedom of speech
and press). See also notes 177-97 and accompanying text infra.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fifth amendment by implication prohibits similar
actions by the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
68. Comment, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 582 (1973).
69. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1975); McGowan v
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
70. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-30 (1969).
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tion,' ' 71 strict judicial scrutiny is required and the government must
establish that the legislation is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.
7 2
Suspect classes are composed of "discrete and insular minori-
ties," groups incapable of looking after their own interests through
normal political means. 73 To date, only classifications by race,
alienage, and national origin have been held suspect;7 4 the category
"poor people" has been rejected as a suspect classification because it
is too "large, diverse, and amorphous." 75 The criteria that the Court
has developed to determine the existence of a suspect classification
include whether the classification is based upon traits over which
the individual has no control; whether it is more the reflection of
historic prejudicies than legislative rationality; whether the group
discriminated against is relatively powerless to protect its interest in
the political arena; and, finally, whether the classified group has a
history of having been subjected to purposefully unequal treat-
ment.7
6
Although it is unclear how many criteria there are to determine
a suspect class, or how many need be satisfied, homosexuals do
appear to meet at least several of the enunciated tests. They
apparently have no control over their sexual proclivities; laws
punishing the condition may arguably derive more from historical
prejudice than reason; and homosexuals, though increasingly vocal
and politically active, have a long history as objects of discrimina-
tion.
Although homosexuals appear to meet each of these measures
for a suspect class, the courts thus far have refused to apply a
stricter standard of review in cases regarding discrimination against
them, 77 inquiring instead only as to the state's rational basis in
support of the discrimination.78
71. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (voiding a Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute).
72. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
73. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally
Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553,
587 (1977); and note 20 supra.
74. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
75. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
76. Id. at 28. See Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972) (sodomy
between married and unmarried individuals held not to deny equal protection of
law).
77. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
553, 588 n.185 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md.), aff'd, 491 F.2d
498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). Cf. Note, The Constitutional-
ity of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613,
1622 (1974) (a finding that certain homosexual conduct is protected by the right of
privacy would not invalidate state laws prohibiting such conduct, but would
merely subject them to strict scrutiny).
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It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, that classifica-
tions based upon sexual preference should be entitled to at least the
same degree of scrutiny afforded those based on sex. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,79 four Justices declared in a plurality opinion that
"classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."0 The rationale was
that sex, like race or national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined at birth, and that our nation has engaged in a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.8' Similarly, although
there is a difference of opinion whether sexual preference is
congenital, few dispute the fact that it is apparently beyond the
individual's control from a very early age - or that homosexuals
have been social outcasts of long standing.82 While the Frontiero
rationale has never been voiced by a majority of the Court,
83 it
could provide a persuasive analogy for the argument that sexual
preference should be protected from discrimination.
8 4
The other path by which classifications based upon homosexual
orientation could receive strict judicial scrutiny requires a demon-
stration that unequal treatment directly affects a fundamental
interest,85 that is, a right which is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.8 6 The right to privacy, for example, has been
held a fundamental interest for the purpose of an equal protection
analysis.8 7 Thus, discriminatory schemes based on homosexual
79. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
80. Id. at 682.
81. Id. at 684.
82. See notes 2 & 11 supra, and note 103 infra.
83. In fact, the Supreme Court recently has all but sounded the death knell for sex as
a suspect classification. In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Scheslinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975),
the Court employed a vigorous version of the rational basis test rather than
relying upon sex as a suspect classification. Even Justice Brennan, who had
taken such a strong stance in favor of sex as a suspect classification in
Frontiero, elected to apply the rational basis test in Wiesenfeld. More recently,
however, the Court has developed and clarified the standard of review to be
applied to gender based classifications. Legislation establishing such classifica-
tions must substantially relate to the achievement of an important governmental
objective. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Discrimination against homosexuals is arguably sex discrimination in that both
heterosexuals and lesbians are protected. See note 152 and accompanying text
infra.
84. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
553, 588 n.185 (1977).
85. See note 70 supra.
86. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1969). Interests that have been
declared to be fundamental for purposes of equal protection include the freedom
of speech (Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)); the right to
interstate travel (United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)); the right to
procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); the right to vote in state
elections (Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)); and the right to an appeal from a
criminal conviction (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).




preference may require strict scrutiny because the unequal treatment
affects the individual's right to privacy. 88
Since the appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice, the
Supreme Court has expressed mounting discontent with the
available guidelines (applying either strict scrutiny or a rational-
basis standard) of the equal protection doctrine.8 9 Professor Gunther
has suggested that a "middle-tier" review is thus being developed by
the Court.90 Generally the middle-tier approach is more stringent
than that requiring a rational basis, but somewhat less rigid than
the strict scrutiny test.91 Perhaps a case involving discrimination
against homosexuals would provide an appropriate forum for the
Court to elaborate on this "newer" theory of equal protection.
In practice, application of the rational-basis standard has
usually resulted in approval of the legislation in question, with the
Court often placing the burden of proof of unconstitutionality upon
the party attacking the statute. 92 A number of lower courts have
cited Eisenstadt v. Baird93 in overturning antisodomy statutes which
applied exclusively to unmarried persons, finding such laws
violative of the equal protection clause. 94 Substantial doubt remains,
however, whether the Supreme Court would follow suit.95 The Court's
apparent reluctance to apply the strict scrutiny standard to
homosexual discrimination has made it more difficult for a
homosexual to allege successfully that a fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection has been denied.
88. See text accompanying notes 31-66 supra.
89. See Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 70 (1973); Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); and Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's statement in invalidating a challanged statute
that was sexually discriminatory by insisting that the classification "must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). See also notes 83-84 supra.
92. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which held that the
rational basis test would be satisfied if "any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify" the legislation. Id. at 426 (emphasis added). Cf. Taylor v.
State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957) (assault with intent to commit sodomy is
a crime against public generally). See generally Preston & Mehlman, The Due
Process Clause as a Limitation on the Reach of State Legislation: An Historical
and Analytical Examination of Substantive Due Process, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 1
(1978).
93. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
94. See, e.g., People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 411, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. 1975).
95. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 553, 589-92 (1977).
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IV. FIRST AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Two other methods by which discrimination against homosexu-
als may conceivably be challenged are by way of the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and
the first amendment's protection of free speech and association.
The eighth amendment has traditionally been used to protect
persons facing criminal punishment, but the argument that it can
apply by analogy to civil punishments 96 has been rejected.9 7 The
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California" held that a statute which
makes it a misdemeanor to be addicted to the use of narcotics
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The Court
distinguished between punishment for a status and punishment for
an overt act necessarily related to that status, and concluded that
the former was impermissible. 99 A later case, however, Powell v.
Texas,100 upheld the conviction of an alcoholic for public drunken-
ness despite evidence that alcoholism constituted a disease. The
Court supported its conclusion by maintaining that the alcoholic
was not being punished for his condition, but rather because he was
in public while drunk.'0 ' Nevertheless, Justice Fortas, dissenting,
interpreted Robinson to mean that "criminal penalties may not be
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
change."10 2 Since it is generally agreed that adult homosexuals
cannot change their sexual preference, it may be argued that civil
and penal legislation discriminating against homosexuals is
unconstitutional punishment.
0 3
Litigation under the eighth amendment in this area, though, is
even more difficult than under the other amendments. Medical
science is still in doubt- as to the nature and treatment of
96. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 300, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (court rejected without discussion petitioners'
contention that marriage statute which prohibited marriage between people of
same sex violated the eighth amendment).
97. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
98. 370 U.S. 660 (1972).
99. Id. at 665-67.
100. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
101. Id. at 532.
102. Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
103. National Institute of Mental Health, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
HOMOSEXUALITY 15 (1969); cf. W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN
PERSPECTIVE (1979) (suggesting that certain homosexuals may be able to alter
their sexual preference).
At common law sodomy was punishable by death. See note 22 supra. No
state today imposes capital punishment for the offense, although very heavy
sentences have been sustained. E.g., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333
(W.D. N.C. 1964) (20 to 30 year sentence struck down on other grounds); Carter v.
State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974) (8 year




homosexuality. 0 4 This, coupled with the historic limitation of the
eighth amendment to criminal matters, renders it highly unlikely
that the courts would consider penalties for homosexuality to be
cruel and unusual.
Arguments based on the first amendment's guarantees of free
speech and assembly have been considerably more fruitful. Over the
years the Supreme Court has developed a "constellation" of personal
rights which emanate from those explicitly protected by the
Constitution. 10 5 Among the implicit freedoms is the right of an
individual to associate with others in order to further his personal
beliefs.106
An independent right of association was first recognized in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,0 7 which held that the right
derives from the first amendment and is incorporated by the
fourteenth. 0 8 In analyzing possible infringements of the right to
associate, subsequent courts have consistently declared that any
denial of benefits - however indirect or insignificant - which
diminishes a group's ability to engage in legal endeavors would
amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee.10 9 Whether
homosexuality should be "legal," of course, goes to the heart of the
question of civil liberties.1O°
The issue of first amendment protections for homosexuals has
been fired by numerous confrontations between student homophile
organizations and universities. There is little doubt today that
students are entitled to such protections. In Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,"' the Supreme Court asserted that neither students
nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 1 2 More recently, in Healy v.
James," 3 the Court articulated the right further, holding that a state
university's denial of permission to use campus facilities for
meetings by its chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
unconstitutionally impeded that group's freedom of association." 4
104. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Gay Students Organization of the University of N.H. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp.
1088, 1094 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 409 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Note, Freedom of Political
Association on the Campus: The Right of Official Recognition, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1149, 1152-58 (1971).
106. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). See generally Wilson &
Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1029 (1979).
107. 356 U.S. 449 (1958).
108. Id. at 460.
109. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
110. See text accompanying notes 178-86 infra.
111. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
112. Id. at 506.
113. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
114. Id. at 181.
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Subsequent to the Healy decision in 1972, three federal circuits
sustained, at least in part based upon the first amendment, the right
of a student homophile organization to sponsor campus social
functions. 115 In Gay Students Organization of the University of New
Hampshire v. Bonner,"16 the federal district court held that although
the university had not violated the students' more traditional first
amendment rights, it could nonetheless be enjoined on the basis of
the right of association.11 7 The First Circuit affirmed, noting that
although the prohibited social functions did not constitute "pure
speech," there was sufficient "communicative conduct" to bring the
organization within the ambit of traditional first amendment
rights.1 18 Communicative conduct, the Supreme Court has held, may
be regulated in "time, place and manner" to further a substantial
governmental interest - but only if the limitations imposed are not
designed strictly to suppress the subject matter of the communica-
tion.
1 19
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews,120 found a clear violation of first amendment rights when
the Virginia Commonwealth University refused to recognize a
homophile group as a registered student organization. In so holding,
the court made clear that the group in question was not devoted to
illegal sexual conduct,121 but noted that individuals of every sexual
persuasion have a fundamental right to meet, discuss current
problems, and advocate changes in the status quo - so long as there
is no "incitement to lawless action."' 122
Gay Lib v. University of Missouri,123 an Eighth Circuit case, is
particularly interesting in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent
involvement. Relying on Healy, Bonner, and Matthews, the court of
appeals had reversed the district court's 124 support of the university's
refusal to recognize Gay Lib.125 The university appealed. Although
the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 26 Justice Rehnquist (joined by
115. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976);
Gay Students Organization of the University of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1974). But see Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) (student newspaper refused to accept a
paid advertisement tendered by an off-campus gay organization).
116. 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
117. Id. at 1094.
118. 509 F.2d at 660.
119. E.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
120. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 166.
122. Id. (citing Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969)).
123. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
124. 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
125. 558 F.2d at 854.
126. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
19791
Baltimore Law Review
Justice Blackmun) made it clear that he would have heard the case
and, further, that he was inclined to reverse the Eighth Circuit:
127
From the point of view of the University ... the question is
... akin to whether those suffering from measles have a
constitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations,
to associate together and with others who do not presently
have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law providing
that measle sufferers be quarantined. The very act of
assemblage under these circumstances undercuts a signifi-
cant interest of the State which a plea for the repeal of the
law would nowise do.1
28
Such casual equation of measles and homosexuality, coming as it
does within the delicate balancing of individual liberty and
governmental restraint, reflects little more than unbecoming
sophistry. In any event, the University sought a rehearing, which
the Court likewise denied.12
9
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: ANALYSIS
BY EXAMPLE
Ironically, while homosexuals have been relatively successful
arguing their rights to free speech and assembly, they have
discovered that the first amendment is virtually useless in prevent-
ing employment discrimination.130 Under the constitutional guaran-
tees of free speech, due process, and equal protection of the laws,
public employers need only a rational basis for refusing to hire or for
dismissing an employee.131
As recently as 1969, the United States Civil Service Commission
maintained that "persons about whom there is evidence that they
have engaged in or solicited others to engage in homosexual or
sexually perverted acts ... are not suitable for federal employ-
ment."13 2 In Norton v. Macy,133 however, the District of Columbia
127. Id. at 1082.
128. Id. at 1084.
129. 435 U.S. 981 (1978).
130. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 934 (1979).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by, Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)). See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
132. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (INT.) 731-71. See generally Note,
Government Created Employment Disability of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1738 (1969); Legal Rights of Homosexuals in Public Employment, 1978
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 455; Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495 (1976). "One homosexual can
pollute a Government office," according to Senate Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments, Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex
Perverts in Government, S. Doe. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
133. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v.
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Circuit held that a competent civil servant could not be dismissed
solely on the basis of private homosexual conduct;134 the civil service
regulation was found to be overly broad and a denial of due
process.1 35 Dismissal may be justified, though, where there is a
rational connection between deliberately public homosexual involve-
ment and diminished efficiency on the job. 136
The same distinction appears to be made at state and local
levels, where homosexuals have been protected against discrimina-
tory regulations under the first amendment,137 but not where their
performance on the job was deleteriously affected,'138 or where they
had engaged in overt, public homosexual behavior. 39
A. Teachers: Acanfora and Gaylord
The problems facing homosexual teachers who commence
litigation based on constitutional rights are made all the more
difficult by the presence of "impressionable" young people in the
classrooms. 140 Most states, including Maryland, 141 have enacted
laws which allow the dismissal of a teacher for "immoral behavior."
Despite the apparent constitutional difficulties presented by so
Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 428 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975)
(finding of immoral or indecent conduct would support dismissal without further
inquiry if conduct has ascertainable and deleterious affect on efficiency of the
service).
134. See note 151 and accompanying text infra.
135. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
553, 556-67 (1977), for arguments against sodomy statutes as vague and overly
broad.
136. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm., 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated,
429 U.S. 1034 (1977). See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
137. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974); Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High Sch. No. 5, 512 F.2d
850 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
138. See Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974)
(dismissal of plaintiff who was a homosexual house-parent for retarded minor
children at a state institution).
139. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1046 (1976), in which the homosexual plaintiff was refused a job after having
attracted public attention by attempting to marry a fellow homosexual. The court
said plaintiff had tried "to foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant concept
upon his employer," and was therefore not subject to protection by the law. Id. at
196. Private homosexual conduct, however, would merit protection. Id..
140. According to the results of a Gallup Poll appearing in the New York Times, 56%
of the general population supported the principle of equal employment
opportunity for homosexuals, but 65% opposed the presence of homosexual
teachers in the classroom. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at 12, col. 1. An article in
the New York Times indicates that Oklahoma now explicitly permits a school
board to refuse to hire anyone who either engaged in or advocated homosexual
activity. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1968, at 12, col. 1. Accord, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§6-103.15 (West 1979).
141. See MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-202(a) (1978).
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inherently vague a term, such statutes generally have withstood the
scrutiny of federal courts.
142
The Maryland-generated case of Joseph Acanfora III provides
an interesting study in point and, viewed together with Gaylord v.
Tacoma School District No. 10,143 accurately reflects the current
confused status of homosexual rights and the law. Acanfora was
active in a homophile student organization while an undergraduate
at Pennsylvania State University. Upon earning his degree in
education he applied for employment to several school districts
around the country, and eventually received an offer to teach in
Montgomery County, Maryland. At no time during the interview
process did Acanfora disclose his sexual preference. He also
intentionally omitted any mention of his membership in the
homophile group on that portion of the employment application
relating to extracurricular activities. During this same period,
Acanfora applied in Pennsylvania for certification as a teacher-a
prerequisite to which was a finding of "good moral character." He
acknowledged his homosexuality at a hearing before the Pennsylva-
nia State Certification Board. Subsequently the Pennsylvania
authorities announced in a public news conference that Acanfora,
although homosexual, had been certified to teach in the State. When
the Montgomery County Board of Education learned of Acanfora's
avowed homosexuality, he was immediately transferred out of the
classroom and into a non-teaching position, with no loss of salary,
pending further investigation.14 4
At trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, substantial evidence was introduced concerning the
effects on students of a teacher's admitted homosexuality. Judge
Joseph Young declared that Acanfora's pre-trial appearance on
several local and national news programs exceeded the discretion
which a teacher must exercise concerning his private life, and that
such notoriety formed the necessary rational basis to support the
Montgomery County School Board's transfer:
Plaintiff's actions were not reasonably necessary for self-
defense. Indeed the media appearances were likely to incite
or produce imminent effects deleterious to the education
process and "instead of furnishing a defense, [aggravated]
the case."
It is noteworthy that the fault in plaintiffs public
appearances does not lie with the possibility of arousing
142. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974); cf. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286,
559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (state court). But see Morrison v.
State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375. 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
143. 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
144. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 845 (D. Md.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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sympathy to the prejudice of a fair trial, but rather with an
indifference to the bounds of propriety which of necessity
must govern the behavior of any teacher, regardless of
sexual tendencies.
145
Although the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge
Young's decision, it did so based upon Acanfora's willful omission of
information regarding his homosexuality, and not upon the
teacher's pre-trial media appearances. 146 Indeed, Acanfora's public
statements on homosexuality were held to be constitutionally
protected speech: "There is no evidence that the interviews disrupted
the school, substantially impaired his capacity as a teacher, or gave
the school officials reasonable grounds to forecast that these results
would flow from what he said."
147
A competing point of view, however, was enunciated in Gaylord.
The plaintiff was an admittedly competent teacher148 who kept his
homosexual proclivities to himself. But when a suspicious vice-
principal questioned him about his sexual preference, Gaylord did
not lie. His subsequent dismissal was upheld by Washington's
highest state court, which found that public knowledge of Gaylord's
homosexuality so impaired his academic efficiency as to justify his
removal. 149 The Gaylord decision has been subjected to almost the
same quantity and quality of criticism as that in Doe.150
There has been relatively little litigation by homosexuals in the
private sector except to challenge discriminatory hiring or firing as
violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,151 which
prohibits discrimination because of sex. The courts, as well as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, generally have held
145. Id. at 857.
146. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
147. Id. at 5003-01. See generally Board of Educ. of Long Beach v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d
691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977); Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d
29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973); Morrison v. Board of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d
214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) (homosexual may not be excluded from
public employment absent specific showing of unfitness to teach).
In Pettit, the dissenting opinion observed in part:
[Tihe majority opinion is blind to the reality of sexual behavior. Its view
that teachers in their private lives should exemplify Victorian principles
of sexual morality, and in the classroom should subliminally indoctri-
nate the pupils in such principles, is hopelessly unrealistic and atavistic.
Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 44, 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665,
675 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
148. 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). His last personal
teaching evaluation read, in part: "Mr. Gaylord continues his high standards
and thorough teaching performance. He is both a teacher and a student in his
field." 88 Wash. 2d at 300, 559 P.2d at 1347 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 288, 559 P.2d at 1342.
150. See Note, Civil Rights in Homosexual Teacher Dismissal: A Deviant Decision, 53
WASH. L. REV. 499 (1978). See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
151. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by, Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)).
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that Title VII refers to discrimination because of gender, not sexual
proclivity.
152
B. Soldiers: Matlovich and Berg
The area of homosexual litigation which has received most
public attention, and one in which the law is equally unclear, is that
which involves military personnel dismissed as a result of their
sexual preference. Almost all branches of the armed forces have
promulgated regulations which ban homosexuals from their
ranks; 15 3 dismissal from the military for such cause, however, is
invariably left to the discretion of the Secretary of each branch. It is
this discretion which was called into question in the cases of




The service record of Sergeant Matlovich showed that he had
fought in Vietnam, repeatedly volunteered for hazardous duty, been
wounded in a mine explosion, earned a Purple Heart, two Air Force
Commendation Medals, and the Bronze Star, and received the
highest merit ratings possible from his superiors. 155 Being aware of
Air Force regulations prohibiting homosexuality, however, Matlo-
vich wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force, advising him of his
sexual preference and requesting that the regulations against
homosexuality be waived in his case.
The Air Force's Administrative Discharge Commission investi-
gated. Matlovich admitted to having had sexual relationships with
two other Air Force men, neither of whom were under his command
and one of whom had already been discharged. Based upon those
facts the Commission recommended that Matlovich be given a
general discharge for unfitness. The Secretary accepted the recom-
mendation but elected to upgrade the discharge to honorable.
Matlovich sought reinstatement to the military by appealing to the
Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records. 56 The appeal
failed, and Matlovich took his case to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
The companion case to Matlovich as it wended its way through
the federal courts was that of Ensign Berg, 57 who had been
152. See Sinisealco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 495, 500-06 (1976). But see Voyler v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F.
Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098
(N.D. Ga. 1975). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R. Fed. 189 (1979).
153. See, e.g., AIR FORCE MANUAL 39-12, 2-103; BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, Art. 2, 3410100, 3420250.
154. Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded, 18 F.E.P.
Cases 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, 13 F.E.P. Cases
269 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated and remanded, 18 F.E.P. Cases 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
155. Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, 18 F.E.P. Cases 1061, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
156. Id.
157. Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded, 18 F.E.P.
Cases 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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stationed in Gaeta, Italy, when an enlisted man accused him of
attempting to commit a homosexual act. Berg denied the charge but
admitted the fact that he was homosexual. The Navy's Administra-
tive Discharge Board, following an investigation, concluded that
Berg had in fact committed the alleged act. The Secretary of the
Navy gave him a less-than-honorable discharge, 158 after which Berg
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
1 59
Both cases were heard by Judge Gerhard Gessell, and both
plaintiffs lost. Judge Gessell reasoned that: (1) Roe v. Wade'0 serves
to exclude the right of privacy as between consenting adult
homosexuals; 161 (2) the Navy and Air Force had a rational basis (i.e.,
morale) for removing homosexuals from the military; 62 (3) neither
plaintiff had been denied due process in that both had been granted
hearings before administrative discharge boards; and (4) neither
Secretary had abused his discretion. 163
Berg and Matlovich appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia where, late in 1978, each won at
least a battle, if not the war. 164 Based on a principle of administra-
tive law,165 the court of appeals ruled that the Secretary in each
branch must state the grounds upon which he exercises his
discretion. In neither Matlovich nor Berg, said the court, was it
possible to tell on what grounds the service had refused to make
exceptions - that is, how it distinguished these cases from those in
which homosexuals had been retained. 66
VI. FLUX AND CONFLICT: LIBERTY AND
THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL BASES
Thus the law regarding homosexual rights is clearly in a state of
flux and conflict, and the uncertainty extends well beyond the
classroom or military cases. Some courts would overturn dismissal of
a homosexual who has publicly stated his views as a violation of the
158. Berg's discharge was shortly thereafter upgraded to honorable.
159. Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded, 18 F.E.P.
Cases 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
160. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
161. 436 F. Supp. at 79.
162. Id. at 80.
163. Id. Judge Gessell went on to commend the Navy for upgrading Berg's discharge.
164. Berg v. Claytor, 18 F.E.P. Cases 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Matlovich v. Secretary of
Air Force, 18 F.E.P. Cases 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
165. 18 F.E.P. Cases at 1063, 1069. The problem was that the Air Force and Navy had
been discretionary in discharging homosexuals and must therefore cite more
than the mere regulation as authority for their actions.
166. Id. Civilians working in the Defense Department or engaged in national security
appear to be protected by the government's obligation to establish a rational
basis for discharging or refusing to hire a homosexual. See Gayer v. Schlesinger,
490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir.), clarified, 494 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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first amendment's guarantee of free speech, 167 while others have
allowed employers to fire homosexuals and thereby avoid "tacit
approval of this socially repugnant concept."16S Some courts would
treat removal of a homosexual bar's liquor license as a violation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, 169 while others
have reached the opposite conclusion.'70 Some courts would hold that
the ninth amendment's implicit right to privacy prohibits anti-
sodomy laws as they apply to consenting adults, 17' while others
have limited that right to married couples. 172 And some courts would
allow a homophile organization the freedom to associate, 173 while
others would not.
174
Few courts have found the act of homosexuality to be "natural"
and harmless 75 - and thus one which the state, of course, could not
justly punish. Nor could the state fairly penalize homosexuals if they
are victims of a self-contained sickness any more than it could
discriminate against dwarfs, albinos, or fat people. But if homosexu-
ality, whether disease or sin (status or act), is deemed broadly
deleterious, a society may in its pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness
impose certain limitations upon the offensive agent - under the
same justification by which it may make education compulsory or
quarantine lepers. 76 Any such intrusion, however, must be balanced
167. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md.), affl'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); note 137 and accompanying text
supra.
168. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1046 (1976). See generally Wein & Remmers, Employment Protection and Gender
Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and
Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1979).
169. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 111, 233 N.E.2d 833,
286 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1967).
170. Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973).
171. State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), modified, 113 Ariz. 107,
547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1302 (1976). See text accompanying notes
34-66 supra.
172. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); note 28 and accompanying text supra.
173. See, e.g., Gay Students Organization of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1974). See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
174. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd,
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
175. See Richards, supra note 7.
176. There are numerous, well-articulated debates among legal scholars as to the
proper relationship between law and morality. Lord Devlin, .perhaps the most
quoted advocate of society's right to prevent immorality through law, argues that
a set of shared moral values is essential to a healthy society, and the violation of
a shared value, even if in private, threatens that health. He also asserts that a
generally held conviction that certain activity is wrong justifies a law against it.
See Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
553, 581 n.147 (1976) (quoting Sartorius, The Enforcement of Morality, 81 YALE
L. J. 891, 892-93 (1972)). See also notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra. But
see W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 104 (1973); H. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); Richards, supra note 7, at 1336-38.
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against equally weighty principles of civil liberties - that is, the
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Civil
libertarians maintain, with some reason, that any law is unwar-
ranted which discriminates against an offensive individual or group
- whose unpopular ideas or practices are not visited upon others
against their will.177
American democracy is based upon the theory of natural
rights,1 78 many of which were propounded by Hobbes and Locke and
later synthesized by Mill. Hobbes developed the notion of a social
contract between the people and the state, together with the idea of
the absoluteness of sovereignty. 179 Locke formulated the social
contract in such a way as to establish the ultimate supremacy of the
people over the government. Laws of nature, according to him, impel
men to voluntary respect for certain primary rights of others. 18°
The framers of the federal system counted security of individual
freedom as one of the elements for its success, and sought to assure
such freedom by way of checks and balances, and by verbalizing
certain "inalienable" rights of the citizen.18 1 Thomas Paine felt that
natural rights included
all the intellectual rights, or rights 6f the mind, and also all
those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort
and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights
of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in
right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has
for its foundation some natural right .... 182
But it has never been possible to develop a reasoned catalogue of
precisely what are the rights of men. (Thus we have the ninth
amendment, that a constitutional enumeration of certain rights
"shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.") Various theorists, to be sure, have attempted the task,
distinguishing natural rights, those already in existence in the state
of nature, from civil rights, those dependent upon membership in
society. The former were absolute, because they involved only
personal interests. The latter affected other men, and therefore were
subject to control by government. But the distinction has always met
with great practical difficulties, such as when Mill argued that laws
requiring Sabbath-observance offended individual rights, but that
state control of family size did not. 8 3
177. Determining when one's sexual proclivity is imposed upon others often presents
a difficult judgmental problem. See notes 65 supra and 196-97 infra and
accompanying text.
178. See E. GERHART, AMERICAN LIBERTY AND "NATURAL LAW" 149 (1953).
179. See F. COKER, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 446 (1938).
180. Id. at 528-29.
181. See E. GERHART, AMERICAN LIBERTY AND "NATURAL LAW" 57, 103 (1953).
182. F. COKER, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 675 (1938).
183. See 0. HANDLIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY 61 (1961).
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Mill's theory of liberty rests on two principles: (1) "All restraint
. . .is an evil. . . leaving people to themselves is always better...
than controlling them"; and (2) "The sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
number of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.' ' 18 4 The first he deemed to be a self-evident truth. The
second, of course, has engendered the greatest amount of criticism:
Is it possible to categorize laws into those which are warranted as
preventing harm to others and those which are not? Is there any
such thing as a truly victimless crime?
The ultimate issue in any system of government based upon
natural law is, who will be that law's exponent? Americans have
chosen to delegate this power to the Supreme Court, which has
defined, restricted, and extended many "natural" and constitutional
rights.1 8 5 Thus the "imposition/effect" test as refined by Mill and
applied by civil libertarians is not an alternative to the rational-
basis standard or others formulated by the Court, but merely a
reflection of the natural law upon which those standards are
constitutionally based. What has remained constant is not the
content of the rights, but the conception of them.
18 6
The founding fathers clearly felt that in certain areas opportuni-
ties for unwarranted intervention were troublesome enough to
require a Bill of Rights. We are thus protected against laws which
would inhibit speech or religion or which would permit unreasonable
searches and seizures. Because the freedom of sexual preference is
not specifically guaranteed, however, the question remains: to what
extent may homosexuality be legitimately restricted under the law's
power to establish a "moral" society - that is, to what extent does
homosexuality adversely affect the social fabric?
18 7
It would appear that proof of such an adverse effect should be
necessary to find a rational basis upon which discriminatory
legislation must be grounded. Obviously there are cases where
adverse effects may be proven. Yet it is equally apparent that no
causal connection has been empirically and universally demon-
strated between an individual's homosexuality and his/her ability to
be a good employee or citizen. There is no evidence that homosexuals
are more involved than heterosexuals in offenses against the
184. P. RADCLIFF, LIMITS OF LIBERTY: STUDIES OF MILL'S ON LIBERTY 83 (1966).
185. See 0. HANDLIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY 62-63 (1961).
186. Id. at 64. See also note 179 and accompanying text supra.
187. The Supreme Court frequently has justified the state's right to a kind of moral
paternalism, the "right to the Nation and the States to maintain a decent
society," or, more particularly, the government's right to base its anti-obscenity
laws on "unprovable assumptions" about what is good for the people. See, e.g.,
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59-60, 62 (1973).
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young;' 8  that they are more violent or prone to disease;189 that laws
against sodomy inhibit children from becoming homosexuals;' 90 or
that such laws have a healthy effect on heterosexual marriages.19
On the other hand, the more that homosexuals feel free to declare
themselves, the more tenuous becomes the argument that the
avoidance of opportunities for blackmail is a rational basis for
discrimination .
192
In short, promiscuity and homosexuality could in many cases be
defended as affecting no one but the parties taking part; were the
pressures of law and public opinion relaxed, however, there might
well be serious consequences for family life and the social structure,
which on the whole we may wish to preserve. 193
Thus the rights of the homosexual must be decided on a case-by-
case basis - as should similarly troublesome problems of porno-
graphy, polygamy, prostitution, etc. Is there an imposition? Is the
potential for social harm significant? For better or worse the arbiter
of these underlying questions is the Supreme Court, relying as it
does on a current interpretation of natural rights as guaranteed or
limited by the Constitution.194
Vis-a-vis homosexual rights in general, however, it seems that
the imposition/effect test would be hard to satisfy if the Court were
to carry its reasoning in Stanley v. Georgia"'5 to its logical end -
viz., that governmental regulation of homosexual acts within the
home is a likely violation of the right to privacy.
The line to be drawn is the traditional balance between private
right and public welfare. If the argument is accepted that cigarette
smokers should be restricted only where they physically endanger
their non-smoking neighbors, then, similarly, only where homosexu-
als engage in offensive conduct by force or in public should they be
188. Richards, supra note 7, at 1334.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1335.
191. Id. at 1341. To the contrary, legal heterosexual relations outside marriage
probably contribute as much if not more to the breakdown of the nuclear family.
See also New York v. Onofre, 48 U.S.L.W. 2520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
192. See Geis, Reported Consequences of Decriminalization of Consensual Adult
Homosexuality in Seven States, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 419 (1976); Levitt and
Klassen, Public Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 29
(1974).
193. See P. RADCLIFF, LIMITS OF LIBERTY: STUDIES OF MILL'S ON LIBERTY 85 (1966).
194. Id. at 55. It is important to note that this characterization of a "natural law"
basis for Supreme Court reasoning is purposefully circumspect. As Professor Ely
points out in his recent learned article "On Discovering Fundamental Values,"
92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978), a slavish insistence on natural law justifications is
highly problematic - as are the other frequently cited theories of "neutral
principles," "reason," "tradition," and "consensus." He ends with a sympathetic
reading of Alexander Bickel's conclusion: if the proper role of the Supreme Court
is the definition and imposition of values, the observer "might well after a
lifetime of searching conclude that since nothing else works - since there isn't
any impersonal value source out there waiting to be tapped - one might just as
well 'do the right thing' by imposing one's own values." Id.
195. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
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penalized. Strict libertarian doctrine would suggest that even
unimposed public acts should be permitted, on the same ground that
one is not obliged to view obscene films,196 and that, moreover, all of
the so-called "victimless crimes" should be legalized unless it can be
proven they have a deleterious effect. 19v Difficulty in proving (or
denying) that effect is, of course, the primary reason for the
continuing debate among lawyers, legislators and libertarians
regarding homosexual rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The subject of homosexual rights is inevitably an emotional one,
on which the Supreme Court to date has declined a definitive
statement, and about which numerous lower courts appear to be in
conflict. Within most jurisdictions the effect of this confusion is
disturbingly clear: apart from the criminal sanctions, homosexuals
may be legally discriminated against, and in many areas of
American life, they are. That in a free society this should be the state
of affairs is a doubtful though widely and hotly argued proposition
- and one for which, whether the advocate be pro or con, there are
no easy proofs.
196. Richards, supra note 7, at 1344-45 n.331.
197. Id. at 1347-48 n.340.
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